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ABSTRACT
The study examines how proactive monitoring by regulatory authorities and external auditors affect compliance with International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) in Nigeria. Data is hand collected from 154 companies that mandatorily adopted IFRS in the year 2012. The study uses the unweighted 
index in determining the extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements of 10 standards and uses multiple regressions in examining how 
proactive monitoring affects compliance with IFRS. The results show that the overall level of compliance is 61% and the regulatory bodies under 
insurance companies and firms audited by Big-4 auditors significantly and positively affect the level of compliance with IFRS disclosures. The study 
recommends an increase in vigilant in monitoring compliance with IFRS by the regulatory bodies supervising non-financial firms and by local audit 
firms to improve compliance.
Keywords: Proactive Monitoring, Compliance with International Financial Reporting Standard, Nigeria 
JEL Classifications: C31, M41
1. INTRODUCTION
Nigeria mandated the use of International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) in 2012. Before the adoption of IFRS, the financial 
reporting and accounting practices are governed by multiple of 
regulatory bodies backed by multiple laws. The multiplicity in the 
number of regulatory bodies makes the system of enforcement 
and monitoring compliance with accounting regulation weak 
and ineffective (World Bank, 2011). Additionally, the regulatory 
bodies responsible for the enforcement of accounting regulation 
are lacking in financial and human resources to fulfil their mandate 
leading to high non-compliance with national standards, fraud and 
insider abuse (World Bank, 2011).
To overcome these challenges, the government passed the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of Nigeria Act 2011 and 
mandated the adoption of IFRS for all publicly listed companies 
effective from January 1, 2012. The expectation of the change in 
regulation and the enforcement mechanisms is to achieve high-
level compliance with IFRS. Prior literature, on the other hand, 
argues that enactments of laws mandating compliance do not 
necessarily improve compliance (Al-Akra et al., 2010; Bova and 
Pereira, 2012; Hodgdon, et al., 2009; Hope, 2003). Prior literature 
also stressed the importance of efficient institutions in ensuring 
compliance with IFRS (Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Brown and 
Tarca, 2005; Healy and Palepu, 2001).
Many regulatory bodies under different acts review financial 
reports and monitors compliance with IFRS in Nigeria to ensure 
compliance with accounting regulation. To the authors’ knowledge, 
no empirical literature has examined how proactive monitoring by 
the regulatory authorities in Nigeria affects compliance with IFRS 
disclosures. Therefore, this study seeks to examine how proactive 
monitoring by regulatory bodies affects compliance with IFRS in 
Nigeria. The study contributes to the literature on IFRS enforcement, 
as the objective of International Accounting Standard Board is to 
promote the use of the standard across the world. This study serves 
as feedback on the enforcement of IFRS in an African country.
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The remaining part of the paper is divided into four sections. 
Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the importance of 
monitoring compliance with accounting regulation and the 
development of hypotheses. Section 3 explains the methodology 
for data collection and analysis while Section 4 presents and 
analyse the data collected. Section 5 concludes the paper and 
makes recommendations.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Literature Review
The importance of regulatory bodies in enforcing compliance with 
accounting regulation has been emphasised in the literature. Prior 
literature argues that the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms 
plays a significant role in ensuring compliance with accounting 
standard (Schipper, 2005; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Daske et al., 
2008). Other literature also stresses the importance of regulatory 
bodies in ensuring compliance with IFRS (Tsalavoutas, 2011; 
Chen and Zhang, 2010).
Prior literature also reports differences in the level of compliance 
with IFRS disclosures across countries with different regulatory 
bodies (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). In addition, Prior literature also 
reported a positive relationship between the regulatory intervention 
and disclosure (Nelson et al., 2010).
2.2. Regulatory Monitoring in Nigeria and Hypotheses 
Development
Financial reports in Nigeria are subjected to review by a 
minimum of four regulatory bodies to ensure compliance 
with accounting regulation. The regulatory bodies include 
the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE), and the FRC. In addition, National Insurance 
Commission (NAICOM) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
subject the annual reports of financial institutions (insurance 
companies, banks, and other financial institutions) to additional 
review. Thus, three groups of regulatory bodies are identified. 
First, a general group of all listed companies (financial and non-
financial) consisting CAC, SEC, NSE, and FRC. The second 
group (insurance companies) consists of regulatory bodies in 
the first group plus NAICOM while the third group (banks and 
other financial institutions) consist of regulatory bodies in the 
first group plus CBN.
In line with the above classification and the arguments in the 
literature, the study raises the following hypothesis:
H
1
: The extent of compliance with the mandatory disclosure 
requirement of IFRS is associated with the category of the group 
of the regulators reviewing annual reports.
In addition to regulatory monitoring by authorities, the 
Companies Act in Nigeria requires each company to have 
external auditors to review their annual report and ensure 
compliance with accounting regulation (S.360 of CAMA, 
2004). This is an additional regulatory requirement by law to 
ensure that financial reports are prepared in accordance with the 
legal requirement. The prior literature argues that auditing is a 
tool for monitoring the activities of management. This activity 
includes preparation of the annual reports, which must comply 
with accounting regulation. Adoption of IFRS for the first time 
requires expertise in international accounting. The international 
auditing firms (Big-4) consisting of PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
KPMG, Ernst and Young, and Deloitte have more of this 
expertise than the local auditing firms whose experience is 
more of local accounting standard since IFRS was first adopted 
in Nigeria in 2012.
Most of the prior studies on the relationship between audit quality 
and compliance with IFRS reports positive relationship (Kent 
and Stewart, 2008; Mısırlıoğlu et al., 2013). In line with the prior 
literature argument, the study hypothesised that
H
2
: Audit quality is positively associated with compliance with 
IFRS disclosures.
Additionally, various theories could be used to explain compliance 
with IFRS. These theories include agency theory, information cost 
theory and political cost theory. Several proxies have been used 
in prior literature to represent these theories including firm size, 
and gearing (Tsalavoutas, 2011). For the purpose of this research, 
these proxies are used as control variables.
3. METHODOLOGY
The sample is 154 listed companies whose annual reports are 
available in the year IFRS became mandatory for financial 
reporting in Nigeria (2012). Ten standards are examine because 
they contained more of new disclosure introduced by IFRS. The 
standards include: IFRS 1; IFRS 2, IFRS 3; IFRS 4; IFRS 5; 
IFRS 7; IFRS 8; IAS 19; IAS 24; and IAS 36.
To determine the extent of compliance with IFRS, unweighted 
compliance index is used. The index is widely used by prior 
literature (Mısırlıoğlu et al., 2013). The index, attached equal 
weight to each disclosure requirement. Compliance with 
each applicable disclosure requirement is recorded as 1 and 
0 otherwise. If it is not applicable, it is recorded as NA. The 
compliance index is computed as a ratio of total applicable 

















Where DCIi measures the extent of compliance with IFRS 
disclosure requirement by company i and DCIi ≤ 1 and ≥ 0. T is 
the total number of items disclosed by firm i where M is the 
maximum number of disclosure applicable to firm i and di are the 
item disclosed and dm applicable disclosure. To determine how 
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the regulatory monitoring affects compliance, a multiple cross-
sectional regression is used as follows:
DCIi=α0+α1GREG2i+α2GREG3i+α3AUDITi+ 
α4SIZEi+α5GEARINGi+ɛi (2)
From Equation 2, GREG2 is the group of regulatory bodies falling 
under insurance companies and is measured as a dummy variable 
1 for firms under the group and 0 otherwise. GREG3 is the group 
of regulatory bodies under banks and other financial institution 
measured as a dummy variable 1 for firms under the group and 0 
otherwise. GREG1 is the group of regulatory bodies under non-
financial firms, which is used as a base group. AUDITi is the audit 
quality for the group of companies audited by Big-4 auditors and 
is measured as a dummy variable 1 for firms audited by Big-4 
auditors, 0 otherwise. SIZE is the size of the firm measured as the 
natural logarithm of the total asset for firm i, and GEARING is 
company’s level of using external capital measured by total debt to 
the total asset. DCIi is as in Equation 1. The regression is estimated 
using OLS and all the main assumptions of OLS are tested.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 below shows that across the three groups of regulatory 
bodies, the bank and other financial institutions group supervised 
by CBN achieve higher compliance of 77% above insurance 
companies supervised by NAICOM, which achieved 63%. The 
non-financial firms achieved 56%. Analysis of compliance by audit 
quality shows that those firms audited by Big-4 audits achieved 
78% as against 46% by those audited by local audit firms. Overall, 
the mean compliance is 61%.
4.2. Univariate and Multivariate Analysis
The result from Table 2 under univariate analysis shows that the 
correlation coefficient between the DCI and GREG3 (Banks and 
other financial institutions) of the regulatory bodies and the audit 
quality (Big-4 audit) are positive and significant indicating that 
association exist among the variables. Additionally, multivariate 
analysis from Table 2 shows that jointly the regulatory bodies and 
audit quality explains 64.80% (adjusted R2) of the variation in the 
level of compliance in Nigeria. The F-statistics is significant at 
1%. In addition, the result from the multivariate analysis could be 
relied upon because it passes the post-estimation test as reported 
in Table 2.
The result from Table 2 also shows that there is a significant 
relationship between IFRS compliance and GREG2 of the 
regulatory bodies (insurance companies) and firms audited by 
Big-4 audits both at 1% level of significance. Therefore, the result 
supports both hypothesis one and two.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The study examines how proactive monitoring through regulatory 
authorities and external auditors affect compliance with IFRS in 
Nigeria. The result shows that the overall level of compliance with 
IFRS is 61%, and there is a difference in the level of compliance 
with IFRS across the three categories of the regulatory bodies 
with insurance companies group having a significant positive 
result. Additionally, the level of compliance with IFRS for those 
firms with the Big-4 audit is positive and statistically significant 
indicating that the level of compliance with IFRS for those firms 
audited by Big-4 auditors differs significantly from the level of 
compliance with IFRS for those firms without Big-4 audit.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of IFRS compliance across groups and total
Statistics Group of regulatory bodies Audit quality Total: DCI
Group 1: Non‑financial 
firms
Group 2: Insurance 
firms
Group 3: Banks and other 
financial institutions
Big-4 audit Non-Big-4 audit
N 102 28 24 74 80 154
Mean±SD 0.56±0.23 0.63±0.12 0.77±0.14 0.78±0.13 0.46±0.15 0.61±0.21
Minimum 0.19 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.19 0.19
Maximum 0.92 0.84 0.92 0.92 0.79 0.92
Skewness 0.02 0.04 −1.20 −1.76 0.16 −0.27
Kurtosis 1.54 2.26 3.84 6.60 2.00 1.78
All figures are rounded to two decimal places. IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standard, SD: Standard deviation, DCI: Disclosure index
Table 2: Correlation and regression results
Univariate analysis DV=DCI
Multivariate analysis
Variables DCI Variables coefficient t-statistics P>|t| Model summary
DCI 1.00 Intercept -0.01 −0.08 0.939 Number of observation 154
grreg2 0.05 grreg2 0.08* 3.09 0.002 R2 65.95%
grreg3 0.33* grreg3 0.02 0.57 0.570 Adjusted R2 64.80%
audit 0.76* audit 0.27* 10.95 0.000 F-statistics 57.34
lntasset 0.59* lntasset 0.05* 3.34 0.001 P value (F-statistics) 0.0000
gearing 0.32* gearing 0.07*** 1.87 0.063 Mean VIF 1.42
hettesta χ2 (1)=0.15 P>χ2=0.6961
ovtestb F (3, 145)=2.11 P>F=0.1014
aBreusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. bRamsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of DCI. *Significant at 1%, Significance at 5% level, ***Significant at 
10% (2-tailed test). DCI: Disclosure index
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The study recommends increased in vigilant by the regulatory 
bodies supervising non-financial firms and by local audit firms to 
improve compliance.
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